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KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL
BLOOD GROUPING TESTS IN BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS
There is no scientific dispute at the present time as to the accuracy
of a properly conducted blood grouping test.' These tests have been
widely used in bastardy suits where paternity is denied, both m this
.country and on the continent. A child must have the blood character-
istics of one of its parents. If it does not have the mother s character-
istics, it must have those of the father. Therefore, a blood grouping
test can disprove paternity m cases where the child has neither the
blood characteristics of its mother, nor those of the purported father.
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However, a blood grouping test will never prove paternity, since
many millions of men might have the same characteristics as that of
the child.
The legislatures of eight jurisdictions have enacted provisions
specifically giving the courts power to order blood grouping tests
and providing for their admissibility into evidence.3 Generally these
statutes only allow the results to be admissible in evidence when the
test established non-paternity 4 Several of these states allow counsel
of the defendant to comment to the jury on the failure of the mother
to take the test.5 These provisions would seem to indicate that the
drafters of the statutes did not believe that a mother could constitu-
tionally be forced to take the test on the grounds of immunity from
self-incrimination. Justice Holmes states in Holt v United States, "But
the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral com-
pulsion to exort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material." (Italics writers) 6 Thus it
appears that the privilege against self-incrimination refers to testi-
monial evidence and not to real evidence, and a blood grouping test
should fall into the latter category It seems, moreover, that the claim
of the privilege against self-incrimination at least has no basis when
applied to the mother because the mother will in no way be incrim-
'Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1271 (1950); Britt, Blood Grouping Tests and the
Law: The Problem of "Cultural Lag," 21 MINN. L. REv. 671 (1937); State v.
Damn, 64 S.D. 309, - 266 N.W 667, 668 (1936).
For a complete discussion of the blood patterns and what they prove and
disprove, 1 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE, secs. 165a, 165b (3d ed. 1940).
'ME. REV. STAT. c153, sec. 34 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 12,
sec. 17 (Flack Supp. 1947); II N.J. REV STAT. secs. 99-3, 4 (Supp. 1946); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. Act. sec. 306a (Thompson 1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 49-7
(Michie Supp. 1950); OMiO GEN. CODE ANN. sees. 12122-1, 2 (Page Supp. 1951);
S.D. CODE see. 36.0602 (1939); Wis. STAT. ANN. sees. 166,105 325.23 (1949).
'So provided in Mmne, Md., N.Y., Ohio, and Wis.
'So provided in Md., Ohio, and Wis.
'218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910). In Elmore v. Coin., 282 Ky 443, 138 S.W 2d
956 (1940) the court held that the taking of defendant's shoes and comparison of
same with prints at scene of crime did not constitute self incrimination.
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mated as a result of the test. In civil suits it is clear that the court
can order the parties to do many, things, such as the ordering of a
physical exammation 7 or the answering of questions as a witness.
Probably the first reported decision allowing a blood grouping
test in the absence of a statute was Commonwealth v Zammerelli,8 a
Pennsylvania case decided in 1931. Courts of other states have held
that a court may order a blood grouping test in an action to determine
non-paternity even in the absence of statuteY The South Dakota
Court has said, "We are entirely unable to agree that a trial court
of record cannot order the taking of blood for purposes of test in an
effort to establish non-paternity, unless there is some specific statute
authorizing such procedure." 10 This is not so startling in view of a
court's inherent authority to order a physical examination." A New
York appellate court reversed a lower court, which ordered a blood
grouping test of the mother, for the reason that the test could not
prove paternity and therefore "plainly determines nothing."12 The
test does, however, prove non-paternity which is the negative issue, so
it seems that the New York court was in a sea of confusion. After
this, New York enacted laws providing for a blood grouping test.i
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In Beach v Beach,14 a federal district court ordered a blood grouping
test under rule 35 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
merely provides for a mental or physical examination when these
conditions are in controversy A special appeal from that order was
taken and the sole question presented was whether the district court
was authorized to order the test. The court affirmed the district court
and ordered the blood grouping test, stating that the value of blood
grouping tests as proof of non-paternity is well known and that such
tests should be allowed.
In all those jurisdictions, except Iowa which permit blood grouping
tests, the result of the tests are only admissible when paternity is to be
disproved."i As to what weight will be given the results of these tests,
'Cook v. Miller, 103 Conn. 267, 130 Ati. 571 (1925); Brown v. Hutder Bros.
Co., 152 Md. 39, 136 AUt. 30 (1927).
17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931).
'Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P 2d 1043 (1938); see State v.
Damm, 64 S.D. 309, - 266 N.W 667, 669 (1933); Britt, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 680 ff.
" State v. Damm, supra note 9.
" Id. at -- 266 N.W at 670 " it is distinctly the majority view that
courts have an inherent power to order physical examination even in the absence
of statute."
'Beuschel v. Manowitz, 241 App. Div. 888, 272 N.Y. Supp. 165 (2d Dep't
1934).
"N.Y. Civ. PnAc. Act see. 306a (Thomnson 1939); N.Y. CMf. CODE: sec.
684a (Thompson 1939).
" 114 F 2d 479 (App. D.C. 1940).
Supra note 4; cf. Livermore v. Livermore, 238 Iowa 1155, 11 N.W 2d 389
(1943) where no distinction seems to be drawn.
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jurisdictions are in conflict, and even courts of the same jurisdiction
have not been consistent. Maine is a good example of this. In the
first Maine case, Jordan v Davis,16 decided in 1948, the defense was
based on a blood grouping test which determined non-paternity The
jury determined otherwise and the purported father sought a new
trial. This was denied and affirmed on appeal, the court holding that
the statute authorizing the test did not intend the result to be con-
clusive as to non-paternity but only that it be admissible in evidence.
The second Maine case, Jordan v Mace,i decided a year later, ordered
a new trial in a case very similar to the first one. The court held that
the jury could not disregard the biological laws operative in blood
grouping tests, but can only decide whether the tests were properly
administered. Since the judges were substantially the same in both
cases, it is clear that they found it necessary to distinguish Jordan v
Davis, which they did on the technicality that there the defendant did
not prove the accuracy of the administering of the test. Though the
basis used might be found in the first case, the writer believes that in
the Davis case the court held the test not to be conclusive, and in the
Mace case the court properly changed its position and made the results
conclusive.
One of the more recent cases which gave a large amount of publicity
to the blood grouping test was Berry v Chaplin.'s Here, Chaplin, the
famous movie star, was accused of being the father of the plaintiff's
child. The parties stipulated to abide by the results of a blood group-
ing test. Although the test proved nonpaternity, the plaintiff obtained
new attorneys and proceeded to trial. The jury found for the mother
and this was affirmed on appeal, the court holding that the stipulation
could not bind the child and that the results of the blood grouping
test were not conclusive. In taking this view the court followed
Arais v Kalensnikoff,19 a landmark California case, which held that
no evidence was conclusive unless so declared by the California code
and went on to say that " when there is a conflict between scientific
testimony and testimony as to the facts, the jury or trial court must
determine the relative weight of the evidence. "-0 Perhaps this
holding was necessary because of the above mentioned code pro-
vision, but other jurisdictions, 2' not having similar statutes, can not
142 Me. -- 57 A. 2d 209 (1948).
"--Me.-- 69 A. 2d 670 (1949).
"74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P 2d 442 (1946).
"10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P 2d 1048 (1937).
" Id. at -- 74 P. 2d at 1046.
"State ex rel Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 805, 58 N.E. 2d 773 (1944);
Tyler v. Costome, 277 App. Div. 90, 97 N.Y. Supp. 2d 804 (1st Dep't 1950).
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logically reach the same result. It seems that by making this positive
evidence nonconclusive, the courts must be leaning upon the social
principle that he who dances must pay the fiddler, even if someone
else also had the pleasure of the dance. In so doing, the courts
allow juries to follow their natural inclination to protect the infant
to overcome scientific fact, and thereby force a man to support for
about twenty-one years a child that is not his. If a man is not the
father of the child he should not be required to support it. This basic
truth has been recognized in some jurisdictions, and, in these jursdic-
tions, the findings are declared to be conclusive.2 2 Obviously, the
plaintiff even in these jurisdictions may impeach the validity of the
test by showing that it was improperly conducted,'2 3 but if she cannot
do so, then the result should be conclusive.
There is no reported case in Kentucky where a blood grouping test
has been ordered. Nor is there a provision in the KErTuciy REVISED
STATUTES so providing. Applying the law previously set out, it seems
that the Kentucky courts may order such a test even without statutory
authority and if they so order, the results of the test should be ad-
missible only when non-paternity is proved, and they should be con-
clusive evidence when admitted, the party claiming paternity being
given the opportunity to disprove the accuracy of the test. Perhaps
if the court finds it is necessary to have some authority before ordering
the test, the inherent power of Kentucky courts to provide for physical
examinations would suffice as it did in South Dakota in State v
Damtm.
24
GERALD ROBIN GRm 'N
"Jordan v. Mace, - Me. - 69 A. 2d 670 (1949); see Gilpin v. Gilpin,
197 Misc. 319, - 94 N.Y. Supp. 2d 706, 709 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. City 1950);
State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309, -- 266 N.W 667, 668 (1936); Beach v. Beach,
supra note 14, at 480, semble.
' - Me. - 69 A. 2d 670 (1940).
"1 Supra note 9.
